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I. INTRODUCTION
As the opening quip of Pam Karlan's article suggests,' it is difficult to
make sensible predictions about the future of the Roberts Court's election
law jurisprudence based upon the two cases decided during its first year.
Even law professors are cautious about drawing inferences from two data
points. And given the many opinions rendered in Randall v. Sorrel 2 and
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 3 such an
exercise is more likely to involve chaos theory than geometry.
A few years ago, I argued that the Supreme Court was in the midst of a
doctrinal interregnum.4 During those last years of the Rehnquist Court, the
Court was aware that a new, cohesive majority would emerge at some point
in the future. Due to the vagaries of politics and the timing of retirement
decisions, however, no one knew precisely who would be in that majority.
For this reason, the Court was trapped in a holding pattern: aware of "the
imminence of a paradigm shift, but.., not sure where the next analytic road
[would] lead[,] ... [it was] content with going through the motions, patching
the holes in the existing foundation, holding the doctrinal edifice together a
little while longer."'5
The doctrinal interregnum continues. We are still at least one presidential
election away from knowing which coalition will choose the path the Court
will take as it wends its way through the political thicket.
The highly fractured decisions rendered by the Roberts Court last Term
provide further proof of the interregnum. Not only do these decisions do little
to advance the doctrine in any area, they suggest that the Justices cannot even
be bothered to forge broad agreement among themselves. Once they have
cobbled together enough votes, the Justices feel free to pursue their own
idiosyncratic views in separate opinions. Indeed, even the Justices writing for
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School. Many thanks to Guy Charles, Ellen Katz, and
Rick Pildes for their comments on this essay.
I See Pamela S. Karlan, New Beginnings and Dead Ends in the Law of Democracy,
68 OHIO ST. L.J. 743, 743 (2007) ("Asked about the significance of the French
Revolution for western civilization, Chou En-Lai is reported to have said that it was too
soon to tell. When it comes to the Roberts Court and the law of democracy, the early
returns are similarly provisional.").
2 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006).
3 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006) [hereinafter LULAC].
4 See Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and
the Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503 (2004).
5 Id. at 516-17.
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the Court are writing idiosyncratically. One could eliminate every reference
to the authors of Randall and LULAC and still know that Justice Breyer and
Justice Kennedy drafted those opinions. All this, of course, is just what one
would expect from a Court going through the motions. A Court that thinks it
is forging doctrine for the long haul would be more disciplined.
Further evidence that the doctrinal interregnum continues is provided by
the four articles devoted to the Court's ruling on the Voting Rights Act
(VRA) claims in LULAC. 6 The authors' interpretations of LULAC are so
different that at times one wonders whether they were reading the same
opinion. This Rashomon effect is, again, just what one would expect from a
Court in an inchoate state.7
One might be tempted to argue that authors are just reading what they
want into the messy, often opaque set of opinions issued by the Court in
LULAC. But that would be unfair both to the authors and to the Court.8 The
authors are uncovering incipient doctrinal categories and embryonic
principles-the kinds of things that lawyers and scholars would have seen in
Baker v. Carr,9 the Court's first one person, one vote case, or in White v.
Regesteri° and Whitcomb v. Chavis," the Court's early decisions on vote
dilution. 12 Given the Court's uncertain state, it is not surprising that the
authors have identified so many potentially new jurisprudential paths. The
goal of this commentary is to pull together these varied interpretations in
6 Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Race, Redistricting, and Representation, 68 OHIO ST. L.J.
1185 (2007); Karlan, supra note 1; Ellen D. Katz, Reviving the Right to Vote, 68 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1163 (2007); Richard H. Pildes, The Decline of Legally Mandated Minority
Representation, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1139 (2007).
7 Rick Hasen argues that we saw a similar effect in the lower courts after Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), another decision rendered by a fractured Court that seemed
unable to foresee where things would go from there. See Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the
Margin of Litigation: US. Election Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 937, 945 (2005).
8 Further, it would hardly be fair for me to accuse the authors of reading their own
views into these decisions given my own claim that these decisions are simply further
evidence of an interregnum.
9 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
10 422 U.S. 935 (1975).
11 415 U.S. 972 (1974).
12 The same was true of Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). See, e.g., T. Alexander
Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing Constitutional Lines
After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 588 (1994); Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map,
The Supreme Court's Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 SuP. CT. REv. 245; Richard H. Pildes
& Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights:
Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 483
(1994).
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order to provide at least a partial mapping of the Court's possible
destinations once a workable majority is formed. I hope here to give both a
microscopic and a telescopic view of the articles, 13 exploring the details of
their disagreement about how subsidiary pieces of the Court's decision fit
together and sketching the broader themes undergirding each author's
interpretation.
Part II.A describes and evaluates each author's take on LULAC's
subsidiary holdings. Part II.B compares the authors' visions of the opinion's
larger themes and briefly sketches my own view of the opinion. This Article
concludes by reflecting on what strategies academics and practitioners ought
to pursue where, as here, the Supreme Court is in the midst of a doctrinal
interregnum.
II. WHAT DOES L ULA C MEAN?
Before turning to the disagreements among the authors, it is worth noting
the limited issues on which they agree. No one in the group thinks that
LULAC is a wholesale victory for civil-rights plaintiffs. Indeed, all the
authors read LULAC as effectively establishing a floor and a ceiling for
Section 2 claims, though they differ as to how low the floor and how high the
ceiling. Further, none of the authors thinks that LULAC allows one to make a
strong prediction about how the Court will rule on the constitutionality of the
recent Section 5 amendments (though, here again, the authors differ as to
whether they think supporters of the amendments should view the glass as
half full or half empty). Further, all of the authors are old academic hands, so
their arguments are peppered with appropriately modest caveats and
cautionary notes.
Despite these basic similarities, the pieces differ dramatically, both in
analyzing the minutiae of the opinion and in sketching the case's larger
themes. First, if one focuses on the details, the authors disagree as to how the
disparate parts of the Court's opinions fit together. The Court ruled on the
legality of three different districts in its opinion, and the authors differ as to
how those three rulings fit together. Second, the articles have distinct
overarching narratives. Some tell a story about race; others about
partisanship. Some tell a story that should prove heartening to supporters of
the VRA; others offer a gloss of the case that should give civil-rights
advocates pause. Each of those articles not only tells us something different
about where the Court is going, but what fate holds for the pending
constitutional challenge to Section 5 of the VRA.
13 1 borrow this metaphor from Chief Justice Hughes, who once said that Brandeis
was "master... of both microscope and telescope." ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 237 (1 st ed. 1962).
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A. Connecting the Dots: Making Sense of LULAC's Subsidiary
Holdings
Anyone writing about LULAC must deal with some concrete problems.
First, how does one reconcile the Court's holding that Texas violated Section
2 of the VRA by dismantling the old District 23, the sprawling Latino-
majority district that had elected Latino Republican Henry Bonilla, with its
finding that the Act did not authorize the creation of the new District 25, a
sprawling Latino-majority district located elsewhere in the state? Once one
answers that question, one must explain why the Court cared about the
dismantling of District 23, which contained a Latino majority under the new
census, but not about the destruction of District 24, which contained a
sizeable African-American population. The Court, of course, offered its own
explanations for these subsidiary holdings. But those explanations were
highly fact-dependent, and nothing about those fact patterns clearly dictated
the ultimate result, as is evidenced by the fact that no one in the field
accurately predicted the outcome of this case.
Simple explanations for LULAC's rulings on this trio of districts also fall
short. For instance, if the Court is simply hostile to all uses of race in
redistricting (something that would explain its decision to question the state's
creation of new District 25), why did it rule in favor of the civil-rights
plaintiffs challenging the dismantling of the old District 23 under Section 2
of the VRA? Why does Justice Kennedy, in particular, join the opinion given
that he has never voted to uphold a Section 2 claim and has previously
expressed doubts about that provision's constitutionality? 14 Conversely, if
the Court has suddenly become a friend of the VRA (something that would
explain its ruling on the destruction of old District 23), why did the Court
rebuke Texas for creating the new District 25 using the language of Shaw v.
Reno, a case long thought to be inimical to the Act? 15 Further, why did it
allow the state to eliminate the old District 24, the coalition district 16 where
an interracial coalition had repeatedly sent Martin Frost to Washington?
Ellen Katz frames this puzzle most succinctly. To understand LULAC's
rulings, she argues, we have to answer two questions: "What's wrong with
Henry Bonilla?," the representative of the dismantled District 23, and
14 See, e.g., Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 491-92 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 926-27 (1995); Johnson v. De Grandy,
512 U.S. 997, 1028-29 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
15 See, e.g., Pildes & Niemi, supra note 12, at 483.
16 For a concise definition of coalition districts and their relevance to the VRA, see
Pildes, supra note 6, at 1150.
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"What's wrong with Martin Frost?," 17 who represented the dismantled
District 24. Each of the authors offers a different take on these questions.
1. Pildes and Occam's Razor
Richard Pildes, who believes that civil rights groups have precious little
to be happy about in LULAC, offers an explanation that simultaneously
satisfies and violates the rule we call Occam's Razor: to choose the simplest
theory that fits the facts. Pildes' broader narrative-the Court's relentless
resistance of what it perceives to be the excessive use of race in
redistricting-is wholly consistent with the Court's prior precedent and thus
seems like the most sensible explanation for what occurred in LULAC. As
Pildes notes, "[t]he Court has never extended Gingles [the case articulating
Section 2's framework] or expanded on it. Instead, it has cut back on the
implications of Gingles at every opportunity."' 18 Pildes thus argues that
LULAC is merely the latest evidence of "a Court increasingly troubled by-
indeed, more and more resistant to-the very concept of minority vote
dilution," and represents "an accentuation of principles that have been
gathering force over the last fifteen years."' 19 In making this claim, Pildes
emphasizes LULAC's apparent importation of Shaw's limits on racial
districting into Section 2's trigger formula and notes the Court's worry that
granting plaintiffs' challenge to the dismantling of Frost's coalition district
would "unnecessarily infuse race into virtually every redistricting. '20 All of
this, Pildes argues, shows that "LULAC has more in common with Shaw v.
Reno and Georgia v. Ashcroft."'21
Pildes, however, must also explain why the Court concluded that Texas
violated Section 2 when it dismantled District 23, and it is here that his read
of LULAC seems to transgress the principle of Occam's Razor. After all, the
Court's holding-that Texas violated the VRA by dismantling a district with
a burgeoning Latino majority-is at least superficially in tension with Pildes'
overarching narrative. Why would a Court so hostile to race-conscious
districting ever find that a violation of Section 2 had occurred?
Pildes offers a counterintuitive argument about District 23 that is based
on Kennedy's prior jurisprudence, questions the Justice asked at oral
argument, and some educated guesses about the Court's internal workings.
Specifically, Pildes argues that the Court invalidated District 23 in order to
eliminate District 25: "[t]he immediate and most visible effect of LULAC
17 Katz, supra note 6, at 1167, 1174.
18 Pildes, supra note 6, at 1159.
19 1d. at 1140.
20 Id. at 1145, 1152 (quoting LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2625 (2006)).
21 Id. at 1159.
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was to preserve one Hispanic majority district; but the short-term, obviously
intended, secondary effect was to lead lower courts to dismantle another
Hispanic majority district that the DeLay gerrymander had created. 22
"Justice Kennedy's discomfort with ... District 25," Pildes argues, "was the
driving force behind the entire VRA thrust of the LULAC decision. '23 He
writes:
The Texas legislature had believed it necessary to create [District 25]-or
some other district like it-to offset its prior decision to carve up the
previously Hispanic-majority District 23 .... If carving up such districts
generated an imperative to create districts as offensive as District 25, Justice
Kennedy seemed to believe, then the VRA regime had to be construed to
cut off this pressure at its source. Holding the re-design of District 23 to
violate the VRA was a means of doing exactly that.24
A skeptic might worry that the argument has a Rube Goldberg quality to
it. After all, if Justice Kennedy is really concerned with District 25, why not
simply grant the appellant's Shaw challenge to District 25?25 Shaw, after all,
is a doctrine ready-made for invalidating a district like 25. Anticipating this
response, Pildes argues that "the Shaw cases had held that race-conscious
districting had to be limited, for constitutional reasons, to districts that were
reasonably compact geographically" and thus could not be used to invalidate
a district that was "culturally" non-compact. 26
I agree that the best way to make sense of Shaw is that it involves a
"district appearance claim" premised on an "expressive harm," as Pildes has
argued in his seminal work on the subject.27 But that is not how the Court
itself has articulated the cause of action in the wake of the first Shaw opinion.
Instead-with the exception of a plurality authored by Justice O'Connor that
garnered only two other votes28-it has consistently defined the harm as one
22 Pildes, supra note 6, at 1141 (emphasis added).
23 Id. at 1143.
24 Id.
25 Brief for Appellants at *43, Jackson v. Perry, No. 05-276, 2006 WL 62062
(2006).
26 Pildes, supra note 6, at 1145 (crediting Dan Ortiz for the term "culturally
compact"; see Daniel R. Ortiz, Cultural Compactness, 105 MICH. L. REv. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 48 (2006), http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/voll05/
ortiz.pdf).
27 Pildes & Niemi, supra note 12, at 484, 506-07.
28 Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 984 (1996) (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J., joined
by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, J.).
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involving intent,29 not compactness, and adopted a test for Shaw claims (the
predominant factor test) that is conventionally associated with motive-based
equal protection analysis. 30 Indeed, Justice Kennedy's description of District
25's shortcomings-the way it grouped together "far-flung" Latinos from
disparate socio-economic backgrounds-could have been lifted directly out
of his Shaw opinion in Miller v. Johnson.31
To be fair to Pildes, while the Court has not explicitly articulated the
Shaw injury as a district appearance claim, Pildes' theory has predicted the
results in the Shaw cases with great accuracy. But even if we focus on a
district shape in LULAC, one could easily imagine Shaw being used to
invalidate District 25. Indeed, the district sprawls across the state, and Justice
Kennedy himself emphasized that District 25 pulled together Latino voters
who lived "hundreds of miles apart."'32
The invalidation of District 25 under Shaw is, in short, the most
straightforward strategy for addressing the concerns Justice Kennedy had
about District 25. Why would Justice Kennedy resort to the indirect method
Pildes suggests, especially when it involved finding a violation of the VRA,
whose underlying premises are deeply in tension with the anti-essentialist
underpinnings of Shaw and whose constitutionality Kennedy had repeatedly
questioned?
Further, if, as Pildes claims, the Court really wants to "cut off this
pressure [to create District 25] at its source, '33 there was similarly a more
direct strategy for doing so. As Symposium contributor Guy Charles points
out, the Court could have used the Shaw line not only to invalidate District
25, but to reason that "District 23 was not protected under Section 2" in the
29 See, e.g., Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1999); Shaw v. Hunt, 517
U.S 899, 904-05, 907-08 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904-05, 911-14
(1995). For a more detailed treatment of this question, see Heather K. Gerken,
Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REv. 1665, 1692-94 (2001).
30 Miller, 515 U.S. at 913, 916.
31 Compare Miller, 515 U.S. at 908 (invalidating a congressional district because it
linked "the black neighborhoods of metropolitan Atlanta and the poor black populace of
coastal Chatham County," which were "260 miles apart in distance and worlds apart in
culture") and id (noting that the "social, political, and economic makeup" of the district
told "a tale of disparity, not community") with LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2618
(2006) (quoting the district court's finding that "Latinos in the Rio Grande Valley and
those in Central Texas... are 'disparate communities of interest,' with differences in
socio-economic status, education, employment, health, and other characteristics") and
LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2619 (finding District 25 to be "not reasonably compact" because
of the "enormous geographical distance separating the Austin and Mexican-border
communities, coupled with the disparate needs and interests of these populations").
32 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2623.
33 Pildes, supra note 6, at 1143.
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first place. 34 As Charles and Chief Justice Roberts have both observed, for
Shaw purposes "there are very few differences between Districts 23 and
25.-35
Pildes would presumably have several responses to the skeptic's
concerns. First, Pildes argues that the Court found that the dismantling of
District 23 violated the VRA because Kennedy believed Texas had engaged
in intentional discrimination. Picking up on language in the opinion that
suggests Kennedy's worry was really about destroying a "naturally arising
minority political community," 36 Pildes speculates that the Court might even
"be moving toward 'embracing' Section 2 by effectively limiting its reach to
cases tantamount to intentional discrimination." 37 Second, Pildes might argue
that Justice Kennedy will have more success taming the VRA by importing a
"cultural compactness" requirement into the first prong of the Gingles
framework, the test that triggers the state's duty to draw a majority-minority
district, than by striking down such a district, once drawn, under Shaw
(though, here again, the skeptic might wonder whether much is at stake in
shifting the Shaw limits from remedy to right38). Third, Pildes would play his
evidentiary trump card: the odd fact that Justice Souter's concurring opinion,
joined by Justice Ginsburg, initially stated that Justice Kennedy's opinion
invalidated District 25. In Pildes' view, this "Freudian slip" may signal that
these Justices "'rightly heard the music being played in Justice Kennedy's
opinion. Even if that opinion did not strike the note that would hold District
25 to violate the VRA, everything about Justice Kennedy's opinion sounds
that tune." '39
34 Charles, supra note 6, at 1206.
35 Id. at 1205 (citing LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2661 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)).
36 Pildes, supra note 6, at 1153.
37Id. at 1154.
38 See generally Daryl Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration,
COLUM. L. REv. 857 (1999). At present, Shaw doctrine limits the remedies a state may
adopt in addressing a potential violation of the VRA. Specifically, Shaw v. Hunt, among
other decisions, prevents the state from drawing a majority-minority district that departs
substantially from the hypothetical compact majority-minority district that plaintiffs must
identify to trigger Section 2 liability under Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51
(1986). See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 917 (1996) (holding that a bizarrely shaped
district "somewhere else in the State" does not remedy the vote dilution suffered by
residents of the Gingles district). Further, given that plaintiffs must already prove
geographic compactness to establish a Section 2 violation under Gingles, one might think
that proving "cultural compactness" would not be that difficult given our long history of
associating geography with community. For a contrary view, see generally Ortiz, supra
note 26.
39 Pildes, supra note 6, at 1146.
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2. Karlan and Hanlon's Razor
Pam Karlan's take on these cases is quite different from her casebook co-
author's. While Pildes argues that Justice Kennedy's dissatisfaction with
District 25 resulted in the invalidation of District 23, Karlan argues that the
causal arrow runs the other way. While Pildes believes that hostility to the
use of race in districting animates the Court's opinion, Karlan paints a
sunnier picture for civil-rights plaintiffs, arguing that LULAC reflects Justice
Kennedy's sympathy for the "representational rights" of Latino voters.
Indeed, Kennedy's notion of "representational rights" provides the
overarching theme of Karlan's disquisition on partisan and racial districting.
Karlan's read of LULAC begins with its refusal to accept any of the
parties' proposed standards for evaluating partisan gerrymandering claims.
What is remarkable about LULAC, argues Karlan, is that "Justice Kennedy
performed, under the umbrella of the Voting Rights Act, essentially the same
inquiry that he had fretted could not be done in political gerrymandering
cases-namely, determining whether a challenged plan impermissibly
'burden[s] representational rights."' 40 She argues that "the animating force
behind" the Court's Section 2 ruling "was the way in which the redrawn lines
undercut the 'representational rights' of Latino voters. '4 1 It was not Justice
Kennedy's concerns with District 25 that led to the invalidation of District
23, as Pildes argues, but his concern for Latinos' representational rights in
District 23 that resulted in Kennedy's dismissal of District 25 as an
appropriate offset:
The same concern with the newfound concept of "representational
rights" may also have informed Justice Kennedy's explanation of why the
newly created District 25 ... could not compensate for the destruction of
District 23. According to Justice Kennedy, the yoking together of "distant,
disparate communities," even if they shared an ethnicity, would make it
more difficult for candidates "to provide adequate and responsive
representation once elected."'42
Karlan-correctly, in my view 3-thus reads the Shaw-like language of
LULAC not as an attempt to cabin race-conscious districting, but as an effort
to ensure that districts drawn to empower racial minorities actually work in
practice. Thus, unlike Pildes, Karlan does not see hostility to the VRA as a
40 Karlan, supra note 1, at 758 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 307 (2004)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)).
41 Karlan, supra note 1, at 759.
42 Id. at 760 (quoting LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2619 (2006)).
43 Heather K. Gerken, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal Protection, 121
HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
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motivating force behind the opinion. In her view, "if Justice Kennedy wants
to protect voters like the Latinos of Laredo, and he does, section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act provides the best doctrinal handle."44
Karlan does not try to identify or resolve all of the potential
inconsistencies in the Court's treatment of Districts 23, 24, and 25. Her main
quarrel with the Court's opinion is its failure to realize that the tools it was
using to police the state's treatment of minority voters could equally be
deployed in the partisan gerrymandering context. Karlan thus implicitly
endorses an optimistic vision of the case, at least from the perspective of a
reformer. She sees a Court willing to prevent vote dilution and wishing to
prevent partisan gerrymanders. The only problem, she suggests, is a lack of
vision, a failure to see how the first relates to the second. Karlan's
understanding of the case, in other words, invokes a gentle variant of
Hanlon's Razor rather than Occam's: "Never attribute to malice that which
can be adequately explained by stupidity. '45
As with Pildes' piece, we can imagine grounds for skepticism here.
Unlike Pildes, Charles, or Katz, Karlan does not discuss how her theory
would apply to the Court's treatment of Martin Frost's district. If she is right
about the Court's willingness to protect racial minorities, why didn't that
solicitude extend to the African-Americans in Martin Frost's district? After
all, one might think that the Court would be more enamored of the coalitional
politics that put Martin Frost into office than of the highly polarized voting
that existed in District 23. If Justice Kennedy is interested in developing a
notion of representational rights under the VRA, as Karlan claims, why does
he dismiss plaintiffs' challenge to the dismantling of Frost's district on the
ground that it would "unnecessarily infuse race into virtually every
redistricting"? 46
To be fair to Karlan, she does not purport to offer an in-depth treatment
of LULAC (most of the piece is devoted to other questions). And even if she
had nothing to say about District 24, I am not sure that a failure to account
for the treatment of District 24 necessarily undermines her theory of the case.
The Court's treatment of District 24-with its fact-specific holding and
circuitous reasoning-looks to me like a judicial punt. Nor should we be
surprised that the Court was inclined to punt on the plaintiffs' coalition
district claim. In the doctrinal world that existed prior to Georgia v.
Ashcrof,47 where the only tool used to empower racial minorities was
44 Karlan, supra note 1, at 761 (emphasis added).
45 WEBSTER'S ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.websters-online-dictionary.org (use
search terms "Hanlon's Razor") (last visited Oct. 12, 2007).
46 Pildes, supra note 6, at 1152 (quoting LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2625
(2006)).
47 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
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majority-minority districting, it was easy to identify a sensible baseline for
measuring fairness. The test courts used was whether the number of
majority-minority districts was "roughly proportional" to the minority
group's share of the underlying population.48 When one folds influence
districts and coalition districts into the mix, as Georgia v. Ashcroft would
seem to require, it is much harder to figure out whether a districting plan is
"fair" because it is not clear how each type of district should count in the
fairness equation.49 Even if the Court could figure out how to count a
coalition district in the fairness equation, it must still decide whether
minority voters can sue the state for not creating one. One can easily imagine
that the Court might be tempted to put off these difficult questions for
another day.
Even setting aside the Court's treatment of District 24, however, we
might still harbor doubts about Karlan's central claim-that the Court should
extend the idea of "representational rights" to partisan gerrymandering
claims generally. At the very least, Karlan would need to put some more
meat on the doctrinal bone to show that Kennedy's vision of the harm in
District 23 naturally lends itself to a solution in the partisan gerrymandering
context. Perhaps Karlan means only to suggest that we can understand
partisan gerrymandering claims as a form of vote dilution. While this would
represent a perfectly sensible description of the injury in partisan
gerrymandering cases, it remains difficult to identify a suitable baseline for
measuring fairness. What Sandy Levinson terms the "brooding
omnipresence" 50 of proportional representation comports with our intuitive
sense of fairness but is far afield from what the Court has been willing to
adopt for dilution claims that involve parties rather than racial minorities.
Moreover, like Guy Charles and Rick Pildes, 51 I harbor some doubts as
to whether the story of District 23 in LULAC is really a conventional story
about vote dilution. As Charles and Pildes point out, what really seemed to
be driving Kennedy's analysis is the sense that Texas was trying to short-
circuit the political process. What Kennedy saw in District 23 was a
burgeoning Latino majority, on the cusp of achieving its electoral goals,
prevented from voting out an incumbent. On that view, Kennedy's vision of
48 Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1017 (1994). For a more detailed treatment
of this issue, see Gerken, supra note 29, at 1675-76.
49 See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 484 (Souter, J., dissenting); Note, The
Implications of Coalitional and Influence Districts for Vote Dilution Litigation, 117
HARv. L. REv. 2598, 2599 (2004).
50 Sanford Levinson, Gerrymandering and the Brooding Omnipresence of
Proportional Representation: Why Won 't It Go Away?, 33 UCLA L. REv. 257 (1985).
51 Charles, supra note 6, at 1207-11; Pildes, supra note 6, at 1152-1155.
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a representational right looks more like a prohibition against interfering with
the "natural" results of the political process-a "do no harm" principle.52
How a "do no harm" principle would translate when one moves from the
micro-level to the macro-level-from the treatment of individual populations
and particular districts to the statewide distribution of power-is not clear.
While it may be possible to tell a "do no harm" story about specific groups
already ensconced in particular districts, it is hard to imagine doing so with
regard to districting at the state level (unless one merely wants to force states
to adhere to what districters call a "least change" plan). Thus, whether one
can derive a baseline for evaluating a statewide partisan gerrymander from
Justice Kennedy's notion of "reprcsentational rights" remains to be seen.
3. Katz 's Interpretive Project
Ellen Katz's explanation of the seemingly inconsistent rulings in the
LULAC opinion prove, once again, that she is one of the field's most elegant
doctrinalists. She offers neither the elaborate narrative account of Pildes nor
the straightforwardly critical assessment of Karlan. Instead, she deftly
weaves the threads of Justice Kennedy's analysis into an argument about the
value of competition in elections. Hers is an interpretive project, offering a
coherent read of the Court's opinion that is grounded within her own
normative framework.
The magic of Katz's argument is that it provides a story that makes sense
of all of the subsidiary pieces of the Court's decision. In her view, the
Court's overriding interest was not protecting the right of minority voters to
participate in elections, but protecting their "right to participate in a
competitive political environment. '53 In explaining "[w]hat's wrong with
Henry Bonilla?" and "[w]hat's wrong with Martin Frost?,"54 Katz argues that
in each case the Court was "redefining" what constitutes "racial vote
dilution" 55 to apply only to competitive districts. According to Katz, the
Court found Henry Bonilla's District 23 to be a district worth preserving
precisely because it was becoming competitive. The Court was unwilling to
prevent the destruction of Martin Frost's District 24 because it was a district
drawn solely to put him back in Washington. "In this sense, Martin Frost was
the Democratic Henry Bonilla, ... the product of the same form of
incumbency protection that Justice Kennedy found to be problematic" in
District 23's dismantling. 56
52 See Gerken, supra note 43 (forthcoming 2007).
53 Katz, supra note 6, at 1164 (emphasis added).
54 Id. at 1167-74, 1174-81.
55 Id. at 1121-35.
56 Id. at 1177.
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Katz thus sees an intimate connection between the two basic claims in
LULAC: partisan gerrymandering and racial vote dilution. Katz does not
claim that the Section 2 ruling was simply a covert strategy for policing
Texas's partisan gerrymander. Her argument is more subtle: "the Court's
concern about partisan gerrymandering and, in particular, the relentless
pursuit of incumbency protection, both propelled and shaped the race-based
injury the Justices identified." 57
Katz admits that such an interpretation, if carried to its logical end,
would "launch[] a fundamentally new approach to minority political
participation. The present focus on electoral outcomes will be replaced with
an inquiry more concerned with the process that produces those outcomes. 58
Katz also offers a normative defense of such a development. She notes that
"[a] competitive process vests in every voter the potential to be the coveted
swing voter" and argues that "minority voters might just be best served by a
political arena in which politicians actually vie for their votes."'59 Indeed, at
the end of the piece Katz offers a brief sketch as to how these arguments
might apply to partisan gerrymandering generally.60
One cannot help but admire Katz's ability to take this seemingly
inconsistent set of holdings and make them cohere, much less cohere in such
an elegant fashion. Her doctrinal synthesis is nominally the kind of things
lawyers do all the time-piece together a set of data points with an
overarching normative story. And yet it has generated one of the most
interesting academic pieces in the symposium.
Nonetheless, let me raise two questions about the paper. First, if LULAC
is really about competition, why does the opinion mention competition only
once, but use the word "opportunity" fifty-two times? 61 Katz uses the phrase
"opportunity to compete" in describing LULAC's holding, 62 but I wonder
whether that really captures what Kennedy was describing here. As noted
above,63 Justice Kennedy's opinion has an element of a "do no harm"
principle to it. Perhaps his definition of harm was inspired at least in part by
the competitive race that would have occurred in District 23 had it not been
57 Id. at 1164.
5 8 Id. at 1178.
59 Katz, supra note 6, at 1166.
60 Id. at 1183-84.
61 This observation is not my own. It was made by one of my students in a paper she
wrote analyzing Katz's piece in my Advanced Election Law class. See Giulia G. Stefani,
Response to "Reviving the Right to Vote" (Feb. 19, 2007) (on file with the author).
62 Katz, supra note 6, at 1183.
63 See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
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dismantled. 64 But I suspect that Justice Kennedy would have found
something in District 23 worth protecting even if the Latino majority had
grown to overwhelming proportions in the last few years, even if the race
would have been a rout. What really seems to bother him, as both Karlan and
Charles point out,65 was the fact that Texas took away the power of District
23's Latinos to "vote the bum out," to use a common phrase in electoral
circles. In my view, Katz gets closer to the nub of Kennedy's concerns at the
end of the paper, where she ruminates on the application of Kennedy's vision
to partisan gerrymandering claims and describes it as a "distinction between
good and bad forms of incumbency protection. '66 This critique, of course,
does nothing to make her normative claims less provocative.
Second, turning to Katz's normative claims, Katz ends the paper
speculating that the VRA might be read to focus on process and not
outcomes, so that minority voters in the future could claim "an entitlement
not to a particular electoral outcome, but instead to a particular sort of
electoral process, one that allowed them a fair opportunity to compete." 67 I
think Katz is right to think that the Supreme Court is more comfortable
policing the electoral process than assessing the amount of political power to
which groups are entitled.68 But I am less sanguine than she is about the
notion that competitiveness is the correct standard for evaluating the electoral
process. There has been an extensive debate on this subject in the literature
which I will not rehash here.69 Let me offer just one practical worry about
64 A competitive race did take place after District 23 was reinstated, with Democrat
Ciro Rodriguez defeating Bonilla. Ralph Blumenthal, Democrat Wins G.O.P. Seat in
Texas Runoff, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2006, at A24.
65 Karlan, supra note 1, at 759; Charles, supra note 6, at 1194.
66 Katz, supra note 6, at 1184.
67 1d. at 1183.
68 Id. I outline the reasons for my agreement in Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way for
the Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and the Opt-In Approach, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 708,
737-42 (2006).
69 Although there has long been a merry war among political theorists on this topic,
the debate in election law circles was ignited by Sam Issacharoff and Rick Pildes'
seminal piece in the Stanford Law Review, Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes,
Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643
(1998), and has raged on for the last decade. For a sampling, see Daniel H. Lowenstein,
The Supreme Court Has No Theory of Politics-and Be Thankful for Small Favors, in
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 283 (David K. Ryden ed., 2d
ed. 2002); Bruce E. Cain, Garrett's Temptation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1589 (1999); Richard L.
Hasen, The "Political Market" Metaphor and Election Law: A Comment On Issacharoff
and Pildes, 50 STAN. L. REV. 719 (1998); Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and
Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593 (2002); Pamela S. Karlan, Politics by Other
Means, 85 VA. L. REV. 1697 (1999); Daryl J. Levinson, Market Failures and Failures of
Markets, 85 VA. L. REV. 1745 (1999); Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding
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Katz's strategy. By now the classic move in response to a competition
argument is to talk about where, precisely, the competition takes place (at the
primary, during the general election, or at the legislative level). 70 Katz talks
about competition in the general election here and has discussed competition
at the primary level elsewhere. 7 1 But if we worry most about "competition"
taking place between groups at the legislative level-the VRA, after all, was
designed to help racial minorities elect candidates to the legislature-it is not
entirely clear to me that Latinos will have a "fair opportunity to compete" if
their candidates, unlike the candidates elected in majority-white districts, are
repeatedly subjected to competitive elections. Such competition, of course,
would likely mean that Latinos would be represented by incumbents with
less seniority (and possibly weaker ties to their constituents). Katz, to be
sure, anticipates some of these concerns,72 but she does not fully answer
them in the limited space she has here.
4. Charles and Policing Through Indirection
As with Pildes, Karlan, and Katz, Guy Charles offers a distinctive read of
LULAC. He provocatively argues that, despite all appearances, "it would be
inaccurate to say that LULAC is only or even primarily a racial
gerrymandering case." 7 3 The arguments in Charles' wide-ranging article fall
into two main categories. First, Charles offers his own gloss on the case,
Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders,
116 HARV. L. REv. 649 (2002); Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition,
85 VA. L. REv. 1605 (1999); David Schleicher, "Politics as Markets" Reconsidered.
Natural Monopolies, Competitive Democratic Philosophy, and Primary Ballot Access in
American Elections, 14 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 163 (2006).
70 For a good example of this move, see Persily, supra note 69. Michael Kang
argues that commentators have failed to recognize that these various accounts of
competition are merely different manifestations of a deeper form of competition, which
he terms "democratic contestation":
Of course, many commentators have debated the merits of different forms of
electoral competition in various settings, whether it is at the primary or general
election, intradistrict or interdistrict, or within or across institutions like parties and
branches of government. However, these debates so far fail to connect those
different forms of electoral competition to the deeper goals and form of political
competition-represented by democratic contestation-that they all should seek to
promote.
Michael Kang, Race and Democratic Contestation 4 (unpublished draft, on file with
the author).
71 See generally Ellen D. Katz, Resurrecting the White Primary, 153 U. PA. L. REv.
325 (2004).
72 Katz, supra note 6, at 1173-74.
73 Charles, supra note 6, at 1187.
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suggesting that it is either about racial representation or, more likely,
representation itself. In exploring these claims, he quite explicitly challenges
Pildes' read of LULAC, rejecting the notion that it represents a continuation
of the Court's anti-essentialist opinions. 74 Even if LULAC were understood
as a race case, Charles argues, it "was defending a nuanced concept of anti-
essentialism that focuses on the authenticity of racial representation." 75
Second, Charles devotes a portion of the piece to the related claim that
"politics, not race, is the majority's concern in LULAC. '' 76
Like Katz and Pildes, Charles folds the three pieces of the Court's ruling
into a single story. He uses the Court's analysis of Districts 23 and 25 as
bookends for his analysis. Charles argues that Justice Kennedy saw two
different visions of representation in these two districts: the "token racial
representation" offered by the newly drawn District 25 and the "authentic
racial representation" that existed in District 23 before its dismantling. 77
Whereas Pildes argues that the Court's decision to sanction Texas for
eliminating District 23 was merely a means to get rid of District 25, Charles
argues that Kennedy was angered both by the destruction of an authentically
representative district and by the creation of an inauthentic one. Indeed,
Charles suggests that Pildes misreads Kennedy's use of the language of Shaw
in describing the inadequacies of District 25. He writes that this language
was deployed not against race consciousness generally, as it had been in
Shaw, but against the "cynical use of race for strictly partisan purposes [in
District 25] at the expense of authentic racial representation" that existed in
District 23.78
Charles then moves from the Court's views on racial representation to its
views on representation itself. Keying his analysis to the Court's language
indicating that incumbency protection is not an excuse for "undermin[ing]
the accountability function of elections," 79 Charles connects the Court's
treatment of Districts 23 and 25 to its holding on District 24. In Charles'
view, "[t]he problem with District 23 is that Texas decided that Bonilla was
going to be the representative of District 23 irrespective of the preferences of
the voters." 80 For this reason, he claims, the Court was unmoved by the
destruction of Martin Frost's district: "[t]o restore Martin Frost to this district
would be to undermine the principle against state assignment of
74 Id. at 1192-93.
75 Id. at 1188.
7 6 Id.
7 7 Id. at 1193.
78 1d. at 1196.
79 Charles, supra note 6, at 1197.
8 0 Id.
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representation, a principle that Justice Kennedy defended in safeguarding the
representational rights of voters of District 23. ' '81
In his analysis of "representational rights" writ large, Charles also parts
company with Katz (and, in my view, comes closer to capturing Kennedy's
intuitions about what went wrong with District 23). He writes that "the
problem is not contestation or competition, the problem is the artificial
interference by the State to eliminate contestation or competition where it
might otherwise exist."'82
By examining the case through the lens of representation and electoral
accountability, Charles is able to give an account of LULAC that most closely
matches both the text and the atmospherics of Justice Kennedy's opinion.
Charles's interpretation not only makes sense of each part of the Court's
holding, but fits the story Kennedy tells in explaining his decision.
Now to my quarrel. I am quite persuaded by Charles's effort to read this
case as one about representation, not race. I am less convinced by Charles's
less developed claims-that Kennedy is using the VRA "instrumentally" to
police excessive partisan gerrymandering, or that this strategy has
"content. ' 83 Nor am I confident that these claims follow neatly from Charles'
first line of argument regarding race and representation (though this may be
the fault of the Court, not Charles). Take Charles's claim about indirection-
that Kennedy is using dilution doctrine to police partisan gerrymandering. It
is not clear why Justice Kennedy would have an impulse to do so. As Charles
himself observes, Justice Kennedy was not particularly bothered by the
results of the Texas gerrymander because its division of congressional seats
more closely matched the division of political power within the state than the
prior plan.84 Or take the connection Charles draws between his theories about
representation and partisan motives. Charles argues that LULAC represents
"a perfect application of the constitutional law theory of exclusionary
reasons"; it stands for the proposition that the state could not burden the
"representational rights" of Latinos in order to protect an incumbent. 85 I
suspect, however, that Kennedy would have cared about the state's decision
to dismantle District 23 just as Latinos were on the verge of electing their
preferred candidate even if the state's motives had been pure. Finally, for the
reasons outlined above, I am less confident than Charles is that the
"accountability function of elections" is a theory with meaningful "content"
81 Id. at 1199.
82 Id. at 1199 n.53.
83 Id. at 1192 n.32, 1196-1202, 1202.
84 Id. at 1189.
85 Charles, supra note 6, at 1201.
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or that it will get us very far down the analytic road, though Charles and I
may be in agreement on the latter point.86
B. The Bigger Story and Its Implications for the Constitutionality of
Section 5
Continuing with the Rashomon theme, the four authors disagree not only
as to what occurred at the microscopic level (the Court's subsidiary holdings)
but at the telescopic level. The authors have quite different views of the
larger themes of the case and what they portend for the case challenging
Section 5's constitutionality that will reach the Court sometime soon.
Interestingly enough, the authors disagree even as to the subject matter of
the opinion. Pildes thinks LULAC is a straightforward race case, yet another
iteration of the Court's anti-essentialist approach. Charles and Karlan see it
as an opinion about partisan politics dressed in the guise of a race case. 87
And Katz sees it as a hybrid of the two, with an idea from the domain of
partisan politics--competition-seeping into voting-rights doctrine. 88
Further, while Karlan 89 is unenthusiastic about the ways in which partisan
claims have been repackaged as racial ones, Charles9° and Katz91 are more
optimistic about this trend. Perhaps for this reason, Karlan sees intellectual
dead-ends and doctrinal confusion in the opinion, whereas Katz sees the
86 Id. at 1197.
87 Id. at 1187-88 (arguing that LULAC was not about racial gerrymandering or
racial vote dilution and reading the case as one about racial representation or, more likely
"representation itself'); Karlan, supra note 1, at 758 (noting LULAC bears the "hallmarks
of judicial review of redistricting over the past several decades: the repackaging of claims
to fit the available doctrinal pigeonholes").
88Katz, supra note 6, at 1164 ("[T]he Court's concern about partisan
gerrymandering and, in particular, the relentless pursuit of incumbency protection, both
propelled and shaped the race-based injury the Justices identified.").
89 Karlan, supra note 1, at 758 (arguing that the Court's use of voting-rights doctrine
to police partisan gerrymanders allows it to "strike down a number of overtly partisan
gerrymanders without developing a comprehensive theory of impermissible
linedrawing").
90 Charles, supra note 6, at 1210-11.
91 Katz, supra note 6, at 1163 ("Many election law scholars worry about these
lawsuits, claiming that they needlessly 'racialize' fundamentally political disputes, distort
important legal doctrines designed for other purposes, and provide an inadequate remedy
for a fundamentally distinct electoral problem. I am not convinced.").
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potential emergence of a powerful new vision of the VRA92 and Charles sees
a strategy for using race to police partisanship that "may actually work."93
Even when one focuses solely on the equal protection dimensions of the
opinion, the authors cannot agree as to whether LULAC represents a
continuation of prior trends or a shift in Justice Kennedy's views. As noted
above,94 Pildes sees LULAC as yet another development in a long-running
story. Indeed, he adheres to the strongest version of this claim: "Every aspect
of Justice Kennedy's controlling vote is consistent with his general, long-
standing resistance to what he views as the excessive racialization of
politics."9 5 Karlan,96 Katz, 97 and Charles, 98 in contrast, believe that LULAC
departs from the Court's anti-essentialist approach and represents a
surprising and unusually generous take on the VRA.
Indeed, perhaps because the usually circumspect Pildes states his claims
in such strong terms, Katz and Charles offer a detailed defense of their views.
Katz, whose seminal study99 on Section 2 cases has made her intimately
familiar with the ways in which Section 2 doctrine can be construed,
emphasizes that "Justice Kennedy analyzed each [of the relevant Section 2]
factors in a markedly pro-plaintiff manner."' 00 Specifically, Katz points out,
Kennedy credited evidence of historic discrimination and its continuing
effects, accepted evidence of racial polarization without quibble, and found
Bonilla unresponsive to Latinos simply on the basis of voting patterns-all
departures from the crabbed reading of the VRA that many lower courts have
offered.' 01 She also rejects Pildes' effort to read the case as one about intent:
"Justice Kennedy explicitly wrote that 'the State must be held accountable
for the effect of [its districting] choices in denying equal opportunity to
Latino voters."' 10 2 Further, Katz sees in the Court's opinion a new vision of
92 Id. at 1164 (noting that L ULAC embodies a "new approach to minority voting
rights" that "repudiates traditional efforts to insulate cohesive minority groups from
political competition").
93 Charles, supra note 6, at 1211.
94 See supra text accompanying notes 22-39.
95 Pildes, supra note 6, at 1154 (emphasis added).
96 See Karlan, supra note 1, at 761.
97 See Katz, supra note 6, at 1170.
98 See Charles, supra note 6, at 1203.
99 Ellen D. Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings
Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643
(2006).
100 Katz, supra note 6, at 1168.
10 1 Id. at 1167-70.
102 Id. at 1171 (quoting LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2623 (2006)) (emphasis
by Katz).
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race. She writes, "the Court necessarily acknowledged that race need not be a
problem to overcome but can be a trait that unites people in positive ways
and gives rise to communities of value."'10 3
Charles shares Katz's view that Justice Kennedy's vision of race changed
in LULAC. To begin, Charles points out that the mere fact that the Court held
that "the concept of racial representation is not ipso facto unconstitutional...
is deeply inconsistent with the view that LULAC is unqualifiedly antagonistic
to the concept of racial representation."' 1 4 Charles also emphasizes the
language and arguments in the opinion that seem inconsistent with Pildes'
view. He notes, for instance, that Kennedy "seemed at ease commenting on
the extent of racially-polarized voting in the area around District 23" and
noted his opinion was "[u]nlike the Shaw line of cases or the nose-holding
tiptoeing-through the-muck image conjured up by the Chief Justice's 'sordid
business ... divvying us up by race' obiter."10 5 He further emphasizes the
"non-awkward references to 'Latino voting power,' 'Latino political power,'
and 'Latino voters,' . . . all references that rest uncomfortably with a strictly-
construed prohibition on racial essentialism."' 1 6 Indeed, Charles goes so far
as to claim that Kennedy "arguably faulted Black voters for not having
demonstrably distinctive political interests from white voters in the
district."'01 7 "This was a far cry from the halcyon days of Shaw v. Reno,"
writes Charles, 108 and the "assumption-that there is a critical link between
racial and political identity-is fundamentally inconsistent with the strong
anti-essentialism bent of the Shaw cases. ' 0 9
Consistent with these markedly different visions of L ULAC's overriding
themes, the authors offer quite different predictions about the fate of the
newly authorized Section 5 when a constitutional challenge reaches the
Court. Though Pildes is careful to cloak his predictions in appropriate
caveats, he suggests that the Court will continue to "unwind[] the regime
Gingles created,""10 either by continuing to narrow the Act's reach or
perhaps even by finding Section 5 itself unconstitutional."' Quite
intriguingly, however, he does not predict the concomitant demise of
majority-minority districts. Pildes notes that despite the Court's repeated
103 Id. at 1165.
104 Charles, supra note 6, at 1203.
105 Id. at 1186 (emphasis added).
106 Id. at 1186-87.
107Id. at 1186.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 1194.
110 Pildes, supra note 6, at 1142.
111 Id. at 1039-40.
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efforts to restrict race-conscious districting, majority-minority districts "have
generated and will continue to generate powerful interests and constituencies
that support [their] maintenance."'1 12 Pildes thus offers a striking coda to his
article: "the politics of safe districting now has a life and dynamic of its own,
one the Court is likely to affect, if at all, only at the distant margins. If so, it
will not be the first time a revolution has consumed its creators."'1 13
In sharp contrast to Pildes, Karlan argues that L ULA C makes it harder for
the Court to find Section 5 unconstitutional: "if the Voting Rights Act
provided a compelling basis for Texas to take race into account in drawing
congressional districts in 2003, it is hard to see how section 5 should lose its
raison d'etre immediately." '"14 Charles does not directly address this
question, though he explicitly challenges the grounds for Pildes' assessment
of the Act's future: if the Court were "as troubled by racial vote dilution as
Professor Pildes portrays," writes Charles, it "would have taken the ready
opportunity to emphatically add another stake through the heart of the
Act."' 15 Instead, Charles argues, the Court "extend[ed] the life of the Act"
and thereby "reduc[ed] doubts about its most critical provision." ' 1 6 Katz does
not address the issue at all, though one might infer grounds for optimism
about Section 5's survival from her conclusion that Kennedy read Section 2
doctrine in a "markedly pro-plaintiff manner."' 17
My own views of the broader themes of LULAC and the fate of Section 5
fall somewhere between those of Pildes, on the one hand, and
Charles/Katz/Karlan on the other. As I detail in a forthcoming comment in
the Harvard Law Review,118 I disagree with Pildes that L ULA C represents
yet another rendition of the Court's anti-essentialist approach. I think Pildes
is probably right that the initial impulse behind Justice Kennedy's decision
was distaste for District 25. In contrast to Pildes, however, I believe that as
Justice Kennedy trolled for a majority and dug deeper into the reasons that
the offset district was needed in the first place, he discovered a story he
found equally if not more compelling-Texas's decision to dismantle a
district just at the moment that Latinos had gained enough political power to
elect their candidate of choice. Justice Kennedy may well have stumbled
across the story of District 23 in trying to piece together a majority, but the
language of the opinion suggests he was convinced by it.
112 Id. at 1161.
113 Id.
114 Karlan, supra note 1, at 763.
115 Charles, supra note 6, at 1206.
116 Id
117 Katz, supra note 6, at 1168.
118 Gerken, supra note 43. Much of what follows in this section is drawn from that
essay.
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Indeed, like Karlan, Katz, and Charles, I think the story told in LULAC
was importantly different from his prior opinions. Justice Kennedy's prior
jurisprudence has been premised on the notion that racial identity is, at best,
an artificial construct imposed by the state (and at worst a divisive,
destabilizing force). And yet in LULAC he comes to the view-indeed,
celebrates the fact-that the "Latinos in District 23 had found an efficacious
political identity."" 19
Further, like Karlan and Charles, I read the anti-essentialist language in
the opinion-the passages dealing with District 25--differently than Pildes.
It is significant, in my view, that in describing District 25 in the language of
Shaw, Justice Kennedy goes on to say something quite different from what
he has said in every Shaw opinion he has authored. Specifically, Justice
Kennedy links the Shaw concern with cultural compactness to a worry about
political efficacy. He states that "there is no basis to believe a district that
combines two far-flung segments of a racial group with disparate interests
provides the opportunity that § 2 requires .... The practical consequence of
drawing a district to cover two distant, disparate communities is that one or
both groups will be unable to achieve their political goals."'120 In essence,
Justice Kennedy concluded that District 25 was a forum non conveniens for
Latinos seeking an "efficacious political identity."
While I am in agreement with Karlan, Katz, and Charles that LULAC
represents something new, I am less confident about whether it signals a
permanent shift in Justice Kennedy's jurisprudence. My guess is that
Kennedy was able to tell a new story about race in LULAC because the story
of District 23 had strong First Amendment dimensions, Justice Kennedy is
widely known for his penchant for that constitutional provision, and the First
Amendment often pops up when Kennedy writes about race. And with or
without the overlay of race, the mobilization efforts of Latinos in District 23
were easily recognizable as cherished First Amendment activities. We could
substitute other adjectives-religious, political, sexual-for the term "racial"
and the story would still cohere.
Thus, while Katz sees the idea of competition seeping into the story of
District 23, I see ideas about political efficacy and expression inflecting
Kennedy's tale. By telling a story in LULAC that was more about electoral
politics than race, more about the First Amendment than equal protection,
Justice Kennedy was able to see something different about race. Justice
Kennedy has long recognized that the political sphere involves robust
associational and expressive dimensions, but LULAC helped him see how
those values connect to racial politics. At least in this case, he was able to
discern an "efficacious political identity" that is also a racial one.
119 LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2619 (2006).
120 Id. at 2618-19.
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I am less confident, however, that LULAC necessarily bodes well for
future civil-rights plaintiffs or the defenders of Section 5. The fact that
Justice Kennedy feels most comfortable talking about race indirectly, that he
prefers a First Amendment story about the Latinos in District 23 to an equal
protection one, signals that Kennedy may still be uncomfortable with the
notion of racial identity. Put more sharply, the story of LULAC may be
nothing more than that-a story, told once and not to be repeated. At the very
least, much will depend on how the constitutional challenge to Section 5 is
framed when it is presented to the Court.
III. CONCLUSION
Returning to the opening observation of this commentary, these four
pieces provide a frustrating reminder that we remain in the midst of a
doctrinal interregnum. These are four of the field's finest members, all at the
top of their game. And yet they cannot agree on the major themes of the
LULAC opinion, let alone its subsidiary holdings. What, precisely, are
academics and practitioners supposed to do with the Court's recent
decisions? One might naively have imagined that a conference on the early
election law decisions of the Roberts Court would have been devoted to
identifying LULAC's underlying principles and figuring out where the Court
will go from here. Yet the submissions to this conference have largely been
devoted to disputes about the basic meaning of the opinion. It is difficult to
have a shared conversation about the Roberts Court when one cannot even
agree on where that discussion should start.
A second reason for pessimism about the future of the Roberts Court is
that these commentaries suggest just how manipulable voting rights doctrine
has become. 12 1 Pildes and Charles read LULAC as importing Shaw doctrine
directly into the Court's construction of Section 2; previously, these lines of
decision had been in tension, but at least understood to involve distinct
doctrinal categories. Katz argues that the Court may be rewriting Section 2 to
import a theory of electoral competition, a goal that is presumably far afield
from what Congress contemplated in passing the VRA. Karlan and Charles
both argue that Section 2's protections against racial vote dilution are being
used to police partisan gerrymandering. All of these observations suggest that
election law's doctrinal categories are breaking down and can no longer
constrain-or even guide-the Court's exercise of its discretion.
The question for academics and practitioners is what to do with the
messy and inchoate opinions generated by a Court during a doctrinal
interregnum. If we cannot agree as to the basic meaning of its opinions, if we
121 Karlan makes a similar observation based on LULAC itself. Karlan, supra note 1,
at 763 (terming the Court's doctrine "elastic").
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think that doctrinal categories have lost their ability to constrain the Court,
how do we write about what the Court is doing or predict where it is going to
go?
Returning tothe metaphor of the microscope and telescope, it seems to
me that there are three choices available to academics and practitioners
during a doctrinal interregnum like this one. First, academics and
practitioners might focus on the granular view-on the story being told in
each case. In LULAC, for instance, the story of the Latinos in District 23 was
obviously a compelling narrative, one able to capture Justice Kennedy's
imagination despite his predispositions on questions of race and redistricting.
Guy Charles' contribution to this symposium gets a good deal of traction on
LULAC because he digs into the story and tries to figure out what bothered
Justice Kennedy about District 23. Similarly, Ellen Katz, in trying to craft a
coherent tale about the Court's seemingly disparate treatment of the three
districts at issue, comes up with both an elegant narrative and an interesting
idea to boot.
Second, academics and practitioners might focus on the telescopic view,
trying to figure out the broader intuitions and impulses that run across cases.
Linda Greenhouse's comments during the Saturday morning session 122 fit
this description, as do the articles authored by Karlan and Pildes.
One might worry that both of these suggested strategies deal largely with
the atmospherics of these cases-figuring out what motivates the Justices-
rather than with legal doctrine. But that seems perfectly appropriate during a
doctrinal interregnum, especially this one. As noted above, when the doctrine
ceases to shape and direct the Court's path, one has little more than
atmospherics with which to work.
That leads me to the third strategy, an alternative to both the microscope
and the telescope: we could stop looking at the Court through either
instrument. As I have noted elsewhere, election law scholarship has recently
taken an institutional turn. Scholars have begun to turn away from the courts,
looking to other administrative mechanisms for improving our electoral
system. Chris Elmendorf, for instance, has written at length about advisory
electoral reform commissions. 123 Michael Kang has explored the ways in
which direct democracy might be harnessed to mitigate the problems
122 Linda Greenhouse, Remarks at the Ohio State Law Journal and Election Law @
Moritz Symposium: Election Law and the Roberts Court (Sept. 30, 2006), available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/lawjoumal/symposium/2006-07/index.php (follow "View
Archived Webcast: 'Saturday Morning,"' remarks begin at approximately the 43-minute
mark).
123 Christopher Elmendorf, Representation Reinforcement Through Advisory
Commissions: The Case of Election Law, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1366 (2005).
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endemic to our districting process. 124 I have written on citizen
commissions 125 and using the tools of administrative law to police voting
rights. 126 These and other contributions to the academic debate move us
away from a court-centered approach and may suggest more interesting paths
for us to follow going forward.
124 Michael S. Kang, De-Rigging Elections: Direct Democracy and the Future of
Redistricting Reform, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 667 (2006).
125 Heather K. Gerken, The Double-Edged Sword of Independence: Inoculating
Electoral Reform Commissions Against Everyday Politics, 6 ELECTION L.J. 184 (2007).
126 See Gerken, supra note 68.
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